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Abstract
Background: Private health insurance in South Korea mainly functions as supplementary and complementary health
insurance that compensates for insufficient coverage by National Health Insurance. However, full private coverage of
public sector cost-sharing led to the problem of encouraging moral hazard–induced utilization, resulting in a policy
change that occurred in October 2009. At that time, the Korean government introduced a minimum cost-sharing
policy for indemnity health insurance. The purpose of this study was to analyze the effect of cost-sharing in private
health insurance on health care utilization.
Methods: We analyzed data collected from the Korean Health Panel Survey from October 2008 to December 2011. We
restricted the two groups to 803 purchasers with indemnity health insurance and 7023 non-purchasers who did not
obtain any private health insurance. A difference-in-difference analysis was used to evaluate the effect of the 2009 policy.
Results: After the policy change, the utilization of outpatient visits by purchasers gradually decreased more than non-
purchasers (0.015 in 2009 [p = 0.758], −0.117 in 2010 [p< 0.016], and −0.140 in 2011 [p = 0.004]). However, utilization of
inpatient services was not statistically significant. Notably, the magnitude of the cost-sharing effect in indemnity health
insurance was stronger for those receiving medical aid. Among this group, utilization of outpatient services (after the
policy change in 2009) decreased more so than non-purchasers. Patients with three or more chronic diseases have not
changed their health care utilization.
Conclusions: Our results implied meaningful lessons for decision-makers and future health insurance policies in Korea
and other countries in terms of cost-sharing in medical care. When policy makers intend to implement the cost-sharing, a
different copayment scheme is needed according to the socioeconomic status or disease severity.
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Background
The primary framework for the South Korean health in-
surance system is the National Health Insurance (NHI)
program. The NHI program was implemented in 1963
by the Medical Insurance Act to provide a social safety
net for the health care needs of all Korean citizens. In
1977, mandatory participation in the NHI program was
applied to firms with 500 or more employees and has
gradually been extended to public officials. By 1989, vir-
tually all citizens in South Korean territories were sub-
ject to compulsory enrollment in the NHI program [1].
Although Korea accomplished universal coverage
through this mandatory NHI program, the public sector
accounts for only 55.3 % of total health expenditure. As of
2011, this figure was well below the average of 72.2 % for
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries [2]. Moreover, household expen-
ditures for health constitutes 35.2 % of total household
expenditures, which is greater than the average of 19.6 %
for OECD countries [2]. As a consequence of such low
coverage and high household spending, Korean people
have had a tendency to solve insufficient coverage needs
by using private health insurance (PHI) [3, 4].
Colombo and Tapay [5] emphasized that PHI is distin-
guished as primary, duplicate, complementary, and sup-
plementary health insurance based on its role within the
health care system and its interaction with public cover-
age. In South Korea, PHI mainly functions as supple-
mentary and complementary health insurance under the
NHI program [6]. There are two types of PHI in Korea.
One type is fixed benefit insurance, which pays a fixed
amount defined in accordance with the PHI contract.
The other type is indemnity health insurance, which
fully covers services uninsured by the NHI program and
out-of-pocket payments for services covered by the NHI
program [1, 4]. However, until October 2009, Korea
faced the problem of patients with indemnity health
insurance either paying very little or not participating in
cost-sharing whatsoever. An OECD report claimed that
complementary health insurance helps ensure access to
needed care. However, full private coverage of public
sector cost-sharing encourages moral hazard–induced
utilization [5]. Unless some form of cost-sharing is
retained to maintain individual cost awareness, PHI
coverage hinders efforts to control outlays from public
systems [5].
According to the Korea Health Panel Survey, the total
percentage of households with PHI increased from
70.6 % in 2008–76.8 % in 2011 [7]. With this increasing
number of PHI purchasers, the Korean government has
been concerned about the potential negative effects of
PHI on NHI. If a purchaser of PHI utilizes more health
care (due to the decrease in copayment under NHI),
then PHI has a fiscal spillover on NHI (i.e., PHI may
result to higher health care utilization and spending),
and there is an inequity in health care utilization between
the purchasers and non-purchasers of PHI. Several studies
have shown concordant opinion that medical utilization of
those who purchase PHI is higher than those without PHI
[6, 8, 9]. In addition, a study showed that those with in-
demnity health insurance utilize more health care than
those who purchase PHI with fixed benefits [10]. Conse-
quently, complementary PHI is likely to contribute to the
rapid increase in health expenditure, inducing fragmenta-
tion of the health system [4].
For these reasons, the Korean government introduced
minimum cost-sharing for indemnity health insurance in
October 2009. Before the policy change, private health
insurers almost fully covered the total amount of out-of-
pocket payments after NHI for inpatient care to pur-
chasers with indemnity insurance. The deductible per
outpatient visit varied from approximately 5000–10,000
Korean Won (exchange rate: 1 USD = 1102 KRW; 1
EUR = 750 KRW, USD $ 5–9; EUR € 6–13). This new
policy requires that if inpatient expenditures are 2,000,000
KRW (USD $ 1,813; EUR € 2,666) or less per year, pur-
chasers with indemnity health insurance should pay 10 %
of the out-of-pocket payments after NHI (i.e., coverage by
indemnity health insurance was reduced from 100–90 %).
If expenditures were 2,000,000 KRW (USD $ 1,813;
EUR € 2,666) or more per year, purchasers could still
be paid 100 % of the inpatient expenditures after NHI
from their PHI company. For outpatient care, deductible
costs were changed by 10,000 KRW (USD $ 9; EUR € 13)
per clinic visit, 15,000 KRW (USD $ 14; EUR € 20) per
hospital visit, and 20,000 KRW (USD $ 18; EUR € 27) per
visit to a general hospital.
The introduction of cost-sharing in indemnity health in-
surance was designed to restrict health care expenditures
by reducing moral hazard in medical utilization. However,
there are two side effects of copayments. Sharing the cost
of health care services should discourage moral hazard in
health care consumers, and the over-utilization of medical
services can be expected to decline [11–13]. However,
patients with low income status may receive insufficient
care when required due to cost-sharing [14, 15]. The role of
cost-sharing in health care utilization has been extensively
examined. Studies performed in other countries found that
out-of-pocket payments on health care utilization had the
effect of controlling health care utilization for outpatient
and inpatient care, as well as for prescription drugs
[16–26]. In Korea, the number of physician visits
decreased as a result of increasing copayments [27].
A study found that patients with low income and
users of clinics were more sensitive to cost-sharing
for ambulatory utilization [28]. Regarding cost-sharing
among the elderly, a study found that outpatient cost-
sharing for this population had little effect on controlling
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health care utilization [29]. Additionally, a recent study
showed that the effect of the copayment waiver policy on
children under the age of 6 years was unclear [30]. How-
ever, the effect of cost-sharing in indemnity health insur-
ance under NHI has not been studied.
The purpose of this study was to analyze the effect of
cost-sharing in PHI (indemnity) on health care utilization
by examining the number of outpatient visits, the number
of inpatient visits, and length of stay. The cost-sharing
included only the beneficiaries of indemnity health insur-
ance. Thus, this study compared the difference between
those with indemnity health insurance and those without
any PHI and aimed to reveal the net effect of the cost-
sharing policy on individuals with indemnity health insur-
ance. Specifically, this study tested the following two
hypotheses: (1) After the introduction of cost-sharing,
those with indemnity health insurance are less likely to
use health care services than those without PHI over time.
If so, (2) the magnitude of the cost-sharing effect differs
according to public health insurance status (i.e., Medical
Aid or National Health Insurance).
Methods
Data and study population
Data was acquired from the Korean Health Panel
Survey, which was collected from October 2008 to
December 2011. Detailed information for families and
individuals was collected from a nationally representa-
tive sample of households; variables included demo-
graphic characteristics, income, savings and expenses,
employment, housing, chronic conditions, use of med-
ical services, medications, charges and source of pay-
ments, PHI, pregnancy and delivery, elder care, health
behaviors, and health awareness [31].
The initial 2008 baseline data consisted of information
from 21,283 individuals in 7009 households. The control
group included those who purchased any PHI, and the
intervention group (i.e., beneficiary group) comprised
neither those who purchased PHI with fixed benefits nor
those who purchased both fixed-benefit and indemnity
PHI, to reduce the heterogeneity of the intervention
group. Thus, we restricted the study population to indi-
viduals who purchased indemnity health insurance or
did not purchase any PHI. Among the 21,283 individuals
at baseline (2008), we eliminated 12,168 participants
who purchased PHI with fixed benefits, as well as 1290
who purchased PHI with both fixed benefits and indem-
nity. Among 7825 individuals, we excluded one partici-
pant whose employment status was unavailable at
baseline. Overall, the sample used for the analysis was
restricted to 7021 non-purchasers and 803 purchasers.
We respected the provisions of the Declaration of
Helsinki and obeyed the protocol for the research pro-
ject, adhering to safe and ethical principles. As this study
used open national data for public access, we did not
need to obtain individual informed consent.
Statistical analysis
We compared the general characteristics between pur-
chasers and non-purchasers at baseline (2008) and
used independent t-tests to compare the means of the
health care utilization variables. The primary statistical
model was difference-in-difference analysis (DID). The
DID was used to reduce the probabilities of time-
invariant omitted variables and time trends by com-
paring results before and after policy reform [32]. DID
analysis is one of the most frequently used and in-
formative study designs for examining the effects of
interventions in the social sciences. To briefly intro-
duce DID analysis, consider an intervention given at
some time point between time a and time b. There are
only two groups (r = 0 or 1), and the intervention is
given only to group 1. For an individual i with re-
sponses yia and yib, E (yib – yia | r = 0) includes only
the time effect, whereas E (yib – yia | r = 1) includes
both the time and intervention effects. Thus:
DID ¼ E yib−yia r ¼ 1j Þ−E yib−yia r ¼ 0j Þ

identifies the desired intervention effect (or the net ef-
fect of policy reform) by removing the time effect, where
the subscript i is omitted assuming independent and
identical distribution across i = 1, N [33].
A regression equation was used to estimate the inter-
vention effect of the policy. The equation is shown
below:
Yi ¼ aþ β1Gþ β2Tþ β3G Tþ β4Xþ ε
In this equation, Yi is the total number of out-
patient visits per person, the total number of admis-
sion days per person, or length of stay per person.
Indices of medical use were analyzed using a negative
binomial model with a log link function because the
data in this study were not normally distributed.
Thus, we used the negative binomial model by using
Akaike Information Criterion. To select the appropri-
ate model, we compared the regression with poisson
distribution and negative binomial model. G is the
group variable (non-purchaser or purchaser), T is the
time variable (Y2008: pre-policy change; Y2009: time
of policy change; Y2010: 1 year after policy change;
Y2011: 2 years after policy change), and X is the set
of covariates (i.e., demographic, socioeconomic, and
health-related factors). In the regression, β3 was the
estimator of the difference-in-difference estimator (the
net intervention effect of cost-sharing). Additionally,
we analyzed the effects of cost sharing on helath care
utilization according to public health insurance status
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(i.e., Medical Aid or National Health Insurance) and
the number of disease. All statistical analyses were
performed using SAS version 9.2 (SAS Institute, Inc.,
Cary, NC, USA). The Korean Won was converted to
US dollars according to the 2008 average exchange
rate: 1 USD = 1101 KRW; 1 EUR = 750 KRW [34].
Variables
The main independent variable was the interaction term
(difference-in-difference estimator) between the group
(purchaser or non-purchaser) and time (2008–2011).
The dependent variables measured quantity of health
care utilization (i.e., the total number of outpatient visits
Table 1 General characteristics of both non-purchasers and purchasers at baseline (2008)
Unit: N, %
Variable Total Non-purchasers Purchasers
Total 7824 7021 (89.7) 803 (10.3)
Sex
Man 3839 3434 (48.9) 405 (50.4)
Woman 3985 3587 (51.1) 398 (49.6)
Age
1–19 1752 1317 (18.8) 435 (54.2)
20–39 1699 1525 (21.7) 174 (21.7)
40–59 1539 1421 (20.2) 118 (14.7)
≥60 2834 2758 (39.3) 76 (9.5)
Marital status
Married 4107 3556 (50.6) 551 (68.6)
Divorced/widowed/unmarried 3717 3465 (49.4) 252 (31.4)
Region
Rural 4333 3875 (55.2) 458 (57.0)
Urban 3491 3416 (44.8) 345 (43.0)
Educational level
Elementary school or below 3080 2711 (38.6) 369 (46.0)
Middle school 1071 972 (13.8) 99 (12.3)
High school 1917 1743 (24.8) 174 (21.7)
College or above 1756 1595 (22.7) 161 (20.0)
Public health financing
NHI (National Health Insurance) 7225 6444 (91.8) 781 (97.3)
Medical Aid (for the poor) 599 577 (8.2) 22 (2.7)
Household Income
Q1 (High) 1392 1169 (16.7) 223 (27.8)
Q2 1686 1418 (20.2) 268 (33.4)
Q3 2256 2052 (29.2) 204 (25.4)
Q4 (Low) 2490 2382 (33.9) 108 (13.4)
Employment status
Employed or self-employed 4338 3755 (53.5) 583 (72.6)
Unemployed or inactive 3486 3266 (46.5) 220 (27.4)
Chronic disease
None 4109 3537 (50.4) 572 (71.2)
One 1503 1358 (19.3) 145 (18.1)
Two 936 899 (12.8) 37 (4.6)
Three or more 1276 1227 (17.5) 49 (6.1)
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per person, the total number of admission days per per-
son, and length of stay per person).
Demographic, socioeconomic, and health-related fac-
tors were included in this study. Demographic factors in-
cluded sex, age (1–19, 20–39, 40–59, above 60), marital
status (married, divorced/widowed/unmarried), and re-
gion (rural, urban). Indicators of socioeconomic status
included educational level (elementary school or below,
middle school, high school, or college or above), public
health financing (National Health Insurance, Medical
Aid), household income (adjusted by the square root of
household numbers), and employment status (employed,
unemployed), Health-related factors included the num-
ber of chronic diseases (0, 1, 2, or ≥3 diseases).
Results
Table 1 presents the results for the general characteris-
tics between non-purchasers and purchasers at the base-
line (2008). There were 7824 total participants (7021
non-purchasers and 803 purchasers).
Table 2 presents the results of change in health care
utilization (i.e., outpatient visits per person, inpatient ad-
mission per person, and length of stay per person) be-
tween non-purchasers and purchasers from 2008–2011.
While the mean number of outpatient visits in the non-
purchaser group gradually increased (13.80 in 2008,
16.10 in 2009, 18.70 in 2010, and 20.86 in 2011), the
mean number of outpatient visits in the purchaser group
slowly increased (11.78 in 2008, 11.86 in 2009, 12.24 in
2010, and 12.32 in 2011). The trend of inpatient
utilization for both purchaser and non-purchaser in-
creased until 2010. The average admission of those with
indemnity health insurance decreased in 2011, whereas
utilization by those without any PHI remained increased.
The average length of stay per person gradually in-
creased from 2008–2010 and then decreased in 2011 for
both those with indemnity PHI and those without any
PHI.
Table 3 shows the results of the effect of cost-sharing
in indemnity health insurance on health care utilization.
With respect to the utilization of outpatient visits, those
who purchased indemnity PHI utilized more than those
who did not purchase any PHI (2.599; p < 0.000). For all
participants, the utilization of outpatient visits increased
over time. The result from the interaction coefficient
(difference-in-difference estimator) indicated the net ef-
fect of policy change. After the policy change in 2009,
purchaser utilization of outpatient services per person
(difference in difference estimator) was −0.117 in 2010
(p = 0.0045) and −0.140 in 2011 (p = 0.004). These values
indicate that the degree of decrease among those with
indemnity PHI after policy implementation was greater
than that of those without any PHI. The number of in-
patient visits and length of stay per person showed a
similar trend; the results for the number of inpatient
visits and length of stay per person were not statistically
significant.
Additionally, results of the cost-sharing effect on
health care utilization by type of health insurance (i.e.,
Medical Aid for the poor and national health insurance)
are shown in Table 4. Among those receiving Medical
Aid, purchaser utilization of outpatient services per
person (difference in difference estimator) was −0.491
in 2010 (p = 0.025) and −0.580 in 2011 (p = 0.008) after
the policy change in 2009. Among the national health
insurance beneficiaries, utilization of outpatient ser-
vices was −0.098 in 2010 (p = 0.053) and −0.115 in 2011
(p = 0.025). These results indicate that the magnitude of
the effect of cost-sharing in indemnity health insurance
was strong for Medical Aid.
The results of the cost-sharing effect on health care
utilization by the number of disease are shown in
Table 5. Among those with no chronic disease or one to
two diseases, purchaser utilization of outpatient services
per person decreased in 2010 and 2011. However, pur-
chaser utilization of outpatient services per person has
not changed their health care utilization.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the effect of cost-
sharing in PHI (indemnity) on the utilization of health
care. We compared a group of individuals that purchased
indemnity health insurance with a group of individuals
that did not purchase any PHI. We analyzed the differ-
ences in utilization of inpatient and outpatient visits and
length of stay per person between the two groups (before
and after policy reform). After the introduction of cost-
sharing, purchaser utilization of outpatient visits decreased
Table 2 Changes in health care utilization between non-purchasers and purchasers from 2008–2011
Year Outpatient visits per person Inpatient admissions per person Length of stay per person
Purchasers
(n = 803)
Non-purchasers
(n = 7021)
p-value Purchasers
(n = 803)
Non-purchasers
(n = 7021)
p-value Purchasers
(n = 803)
Non-purchasers
(n = 7021)
p-value
2008 11.78 13.80 0.001 0.12 0.16 0.009 0.92 2.26 <.0001
2009 11.86 16.10 <.0001 0.13 0.17 <.0001 0.96 2.66 <.0001
2010 12.24 18.70 <.0001 0.14 0.21 <.0001 1.21 3.42 <.0001
2011 12.32 20.86 <.0001 0.12 0.23 <.0001 0.96 3.21 <.0001
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Table 3 Effects of cost-sharing in indemnity health insurance on health care utilization
Variable Outpatient visits per person Inpatient admissions per person Length of stay per person
ß S.E p-value ß S.E p-value ß S.E p-value
Sex
Man Ref. Ref. Ref.
Woman 0.179 0.025 <.0001 −0.206 0.060 0.001 −0.356 0.093 0.000
Age
1–19 Ref. Ref. Ref.
20–39 −0.592 0.041 <.0001 0.272 0.145 0.060 0.675 0.200 0.001
40–59 −0.426 0.049 <.0001 0.224 0.166 0.177 1.381 0.243 <.0001
above 60 −0.114 0.042 0.007 0.486 0.168 0.004 1.592 0.191 <.0001
Marital status
Divorced/widowed/unmarried Ref. Ref. Ref.
Married 0.371 0.032 <.0001 0.261 0.066 <.0001 −0.068 0.147 0.646
Educational level
Below elementary school Ref. Ref. Ref.
Middle school −0.437 0.030 <.0001 −0.244 0.088 0.006 −0.317 0.126 0.012
High school −0.573 0.031 <.0001 −0.284 0.074 0.000 −0.388 0.122 0.001
Above college −0.790 0.040 <.0001 −0.515 0.109 <.0001 −0.670 0.204 0.001
Public health financing
National Health Insurance Ref. Ref. Ref.
Medical Aid (for the poor) 0.245 0.037 <.0001 0.593 0.083 <.0001 0.770 0.139 <.0001
Chronic disease
None Ref. Ref. Ref.
One 0.818 0.032 <.0001 0.801 0.114 <.0001 1.056 0.148 <.0001
Two 1.133 0.036 <.0001 0.970 0.103 <.0001 1.089 0.186 <.0001
Three or more 1.478 0.035 <.0001 1.418 0.097 <.0001 1.340 0.150 <.0001
Household Income
Q1(High) Ref. Ref. Ref.
Q2 −0.061 0.027 0.023 0.093 0.093 0.316 −0.011 0.115 0.926
Q3 −0.053 0.027 0.048 −0.037 0.080 0.639 −0.079 0.122 0.516
Q4(Low) −0.088 0.028 0.002 −0.150 0.080 0.062 −0.137 0.139 0.324
Employment status
Employed or self-employed Ref. Ref. Ref.
Unemployed or inactive 0.116 0.025 <.0001 0.320 0.055 <.0001 0.445 0.099 <.0001
Region
Rural Ref. Ref. Ref.
Urban −0.016 0.023 0.475 −0.296 0.055 <.0001 −0.293 0.087 0.001
Time
2008 Ref. Ref. Ref.
2009 0.050 0.016 0.002 −0.073 0.067 0.281 0.124 0.113 0.269
2010 0.115 0.019 <.0001 0.020 0.067 0.769 0.036 0.096 0.708
2011 0.142 0.020 <.0001 0.047 0.071 0.505 −0.038 0.097 0.695
Group (indemnity health insurance)
Non-purchasers Ref. Ref. Ref.
Purchasers 0.340 0.042 <.0001 0.320 0.153 0.036 0.202 0.184 0.272
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more than non-purchaser utilization of outpatient visits
over time. However, the magnitude of the cost-sharing
effect was stronger for the poor (i.e., those receiving
Medical Aid).
Our results were similar to the results of several
previous studies. In France, reduction of out-of-
pocket payments was found to encourage moral haz-
ard in home-visit care [35]. A study of self-selection
and moral hazard in Chile found that cost-sharing
significantly affected outpatient utilization yet not in-
patient utilization [36]. However, the findings of a
study performed in Korea were different from our
findings. This study used data from a PHI company
and analyzed changes in health care consumption be-
fore and after the introduction and expansion of cost-
sharing in indemnity PHI. The post-introduction and
expansion group consumed less health care than the
pre-introduction and expansion group for both in-
patient days and outpatient visits [37]. With regard to
the inpatients health care, our findings may be differ-
ent from those of this previous study. In our study,
cost-sharing for inpatient health care did not reduce
the utilization of inpatient visits or length of stay per
person. Differences in the mechanisms between out-
patient and inpatient visits may have contributed to
the differences in the results. Inpatient-care utilization is
influenced more by physician recommendations and dis-
ease severity than by patient decisions [17]. In other
words, the role of the medical provider as decision-maker
was more important than the role of the patient in the
case of inpatient utilization. Therefore, cost-sharing for in-
patient health care utilization was not affected. Another
possible explanation is because the data used in the
previous study in Korea was obtained from only one PHI
company.
The introduction of cost-sharing in indemnity health
insurance appeared to have affected the decrease in out-
patient visits. In 2009, the outpatient visits of purchasers
declined more than non-purchasers; however, this differ-
ence was not statistically significant. It is possible that
the effect size was not significant due to the policy only
being implemented in October 2009. Nevertheless, the
number of outpatient visits gradually declined from
2009–2011. This result indicated that the effect of cost-
sharing on the utilization of inpatient care occurred after
policy reform. The results of previous studies found that
individuals who purchased PHI had an influence on
increases in health care utilization [4, 6, 10, 38]. Conse-
quently, our results may indicate that PHI-purchaser
outpatient visits occurred after the policy change.
Additionally, we analyzed the effect of cost-sharing
on health care utilization by type of health insurance
(Medical Aid, NHI). The utilization of outpatient
visits declined for both Medical Aid and NHI benefi-
ciaries after the introduction of cost-sharing. However,
the magnitude of the cost-sharing effect was stronger
for Medical Aid. This result may indicate that low-
income patients are more sensitive to cost-sharing.
Other studies reported similar differences in the effect
size of cost-sharing by economic status. A study in
Japan showed that utilization of outpatient care was
most sensitive to the copayment rate [16]. Per-capita
income stratification models revealed that the greatest
copayment effect on inpatient care was for the lowest
income group in the National Health Insurance sys-
tem. A Korean study also showed that the magnitude
of the impact of copayment on the number of phys-
ician visits varied depending on income level. Increas-
ing cost-sharing rates affected health care utilization
by individuals with relatively low income [28]. These
results indicated that increasing copayment rates may
raise problems by discouraging access to medical care
services for the poor.
We additionally analyzed the effect of cost-sharing on
health care utilization by the number of diseases to de-
termine how different patterns of utilization. In our
study, the patterns of utilization among the purchaser
with 3 or more chronic diseases is significantly no differ-
ence after the introduction of cost-sharing in terms of
both the number of inpatient days per person and the
outpatient visit per person. These results implied that
the policy on copayment may result in different patterns
of health care utilization according to a proxy as the dis-
ease severity of patients.
Before the policy change, the decreasing health care
utilization was anticipated among those with supplemen-
tary PHI. Although the increasing cost-sharing affected
the utilization of outpatient care, these findings do not
explain that there was over utilization or that services
were appropriately used before policy reform. We could
not certainly explain whether purchasers unnecessarily
used more health care resources than non-purchaser be-
fore the introduction of policy. Also, we could not know
change in pattern of outpatient visits among purchasers
Table 3 Effects of cost-sharing in indemnity health insurance on health care utilization (Continued)
Time x Group (difference in difference estimator)
2009 0.015 0.050 0.758 0.154 0.173 0.372 0.108 0.242 0.655
2010 −0.117 0.049 0.016 0.045 0.167 0.785 0.264 0.257 0.304
2011 −0.140 0.049 0.004 −0.209 0.169 0.216 −0.147 0.224 0.511
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Table 4 Effects of cost-sharing in indemnity health insurance on health care utilization according to public health financing
Medical aid (for the poor, n = 599) National helath insurance (n = 7225)
Variablea Outpatient visits per
person
Inpatient admissions per
person
Length of stay per
person
Outpatient visits per
person
Inpatient admissions per
person
Length of stay per
person
ß S.E p-value ß S.E p-value ß S.E p-value ß S.E p-value ß S.E p-value ß S.E p-value
Time
2008 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
2009 0.071 0.044 0.105 −0.016 0.135 0.905 −0.025 0.273 0.927 0.047 0.017 0.006 −0.083 0.075 0.269 0.157 1.280 0.201
2010 0.086 0.050 0.084 0.040 0.134 0.762 0.027 0.197 0.889 0.121 0.021 <.0001 0.010 0.075 0.894 0.020 0.190 0.851
2011 0.092 0.050 0.069 0.057 0.140 0.682 −0.092 0.228 0.688 0.146 0.022 <.0001 0.043 0.080 0.588 −0.017 −0.160 0.873
Group (indemnity health insurance)
Non-purchasers Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Purchasers 0.928 0.207 <.0001 1.557 0.518 0.003 1.898 0.649 0.003 0.312 0.043 <.0001 0.250 0.161 0.119 0.128 0.680 0.498
Time x Group (difference-in-difference
estimator)
2009 −0.345 0.180 0.055 −0.690 0.643 0.283 −1.613 0.718 0.025 0.038 0.053 0.469 0.180 0.178 0.312 0.147 0.590 0.556
2010 −0.491 0.219 0.025 −1.695 0.738 0.022 −2.978 0.910 0.001 −0.098 0.051 0.053 0.153 0.172 0.373 0.393 1.520 0.129
2011 −0.580 0.218 0.008 −0.966 0.542 0.074 −1.435 0.682 0.035 −0.115 0.051 0.025 −0.181 0.179 0.313 −0.104 −0.450 0.653
aAdjusted for sex, age, marital status, education level, the number of chronic disease, household income, region, and employment status
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is due to decreasing unnecessary utilization. However,
our findings at least show that the patients with three or
more chronic disease, whom are likely to need the
addressed health care, have not changed their utilization
patterns after the policy implementation. Further, given
that the poor people usually were unhealthy, copayment
Table 5 Effects of cost-sharing in indemity health insurance on health care utilization according to the number of disease
Variablea Outpatient visits per person Inpatient admissions per person Length of stay per person
ß S.E p-value ß S.E p-value ß S.E p-value
No chronic disease (n = 4109)
Time
2008 Ref. Ref. Ref.
2009 0.227 0.038 <.0001 0.136 0.131 0.297 0.344 0.217 0.112
2010 0.366 0.042 <.0001 0.351 0.144 0.015 0.081 0.192 0.672
2011 0.427 0.046 <.0001 0.229 0.147 0.118 0.136 0.202 0.500
Group (indemnity health insurance)
Non-purchaser Ref. Ref. Ref.
Purchaser 0.444 0.062 <.0001 0.697 0.188 0.000 0.455 0.234 0.052
Time x Group (difference in difference estimator)
2009 0.029 0.079 0.716 −0.126 0.251 0.617 0.037 0.343 0.915
2010 −0.160 0.074 0.031 −0.180 0.257 0.483 0.470 0.344 0.171
2011 −0.177 0.079 0.025 −0.347 0.263 0.187 −0.144 0.328 0.660
1–2 (n = 2439)
Time
2008 Ref. Ref. Ref.
2009 0.015 0.023 0.519 −0.155 0.126 0.216 0.074 0.198 0.709
2010 0.054 0.030 0.075 −0.079 0.127 0.537 −0.095 0.146 0.515
2011 0.077 0.034 0.022 −0.034 0.158 0.830 −0.148 0.159 0.353
Group (indemnity health insurance)
Non-purchaser Ref. Ref. Ref.
Purchaser 0.267 0.066 <.0001 0.095 0.291 0.744 0.190 0.376 0.613
Time x Group (difference in difference estimator)
2009 −0.226 0.069 0.001 0.403 0.295 0.172 −0.059 0.443 0.894
2010 −0.245 0.075 0.001 0.122 0.271 0.654 −0.104 0.415 0.802
2011 −0.313 0.079 <.0001 −0.134 0.291 0.645 −0.258 0.420 0.539
3 or more (n = 1276)
Time
2008 Ref. Ref. Ref.
2009 0.019 0.022 0.385 −0.083 0.088 0.345 −0.168 0.136 0.217
2010 0.075 0.024 0.002 −0.020 0.082 0.808 −0.013 0.138 0.926
2011 0.116 0.025 <.0001 0.085 0.083 0.306 0.022 0.136 0.871
Group (indemnity health insurance)
Non-purchaser Ref. Ref. Ref.
Purchaser −0.093 0.126 0.459 −0.385 0.366 0.293 −0.073 0.414 0.861
Time x Group (difference in difference estimator)
2009 −0.014 0.122 0.909 −0.021 0.428 0.962 −0.795 0.515 0.123
2010 0.000 0.148 0.998 0.077 0.429 0.858 −0.266 0.444 0.549
2011 −0.020 0.131 0.878 0.364 0.434 0.402 0.445 0.500 0.374
aAdjusted for sex, age, marital status, education level, the number of chronic disease, household income, region, and employment status
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policy led to inhibit the access of health care among
these vulnerable groups.
This study has several limitations. First, if individuals
who purchased PHI before 2009 renewed their contract
with a PHI provider, the prior policy was applied to the
contract renewal, as the 2009 change was not retro-
active. However, this study could not distinguish
between new members and renewal members. Second,
this study focused on the effect of health care utilization
by both inpatients and outpatients. However, we could
not account for the effect of changes in deductibles
applied to the cost of drugs. An analysis of changes in
the utilization of drugs should be performed. Third, the
outcome variables were related to health care utilization,
comprising the number of visits and length of stay.
These indicators were rather broad, making it difficult to
explain the consequences of our study, as health care
utilization differs from specific diseases (e.g., a life-
threatening situation versus a minor health problem).
Fourth, the intervention events must be exempt, and
other characteristic should be similar between the
groups when using the difference in difference approach.
However, the purchasers with indemnity PHI were
healthier and younger and had a higher household
income than non-purchaser. Thus, the estimate of policy
effect could be biased and different characteristic might
have affected the observed utilization pattern. These lim-
itations will be considered in a future study.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the impact of cost-sharing on health care
utilization has been well established. In our study, there
were two sides effect of cost-sharing in indemnity health
insurance. Overall utilization of outpatients decreased
after the introduction of cost-sharing in indemnity health
insurance; however, this effect size was stronger for the
poor and patients with three or more chronic diseases
have not changed their health care utilization. Although
the introduction of cost-sharing in indemnity health insur-
ance was designed to restrict health care expenditure by
reducing moral hazard in medical utilization, cost-sharing
lead to reduced access to medical service utilization for
the poor. Thus, these results implied meaningful lessons
for decision-makers and future health insurance policies
in Korea and other countries in terms of cost-sharing in
medical care. When policy makers intend to implement
the cost-sharing, a different copayment scheme is needed
according to the socioeconomic status or disease severity.
It has been shown that people in vulnerable groups are
more susceptible to lowered access when implementing
cost-sharing [39]. In line with previous studies, our results
also showed similar trends. Hence, when designing the
cost-sharing scheme, we suggest that low rate of cost-
sharing in indemnity health insurance may be applied to
the poor or persons who need health care (i.e., persons
who had many disease or severe disease) so that people of
low socioeconomic status or those whom essentially
require health care utilization are not hindered from med-
ical access.
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